Campaign 2001 Feature

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The Nod of the Bosses... Scramble for the City Council... Basic Training for Council Recruits... How They Stack up on Term Limit... Dynasties... The Speech that Saved Term Limits...


What is Searchlight on Campaign 2001?
Searchlight on Campaign 2001 is a guide to the political races in what many are calling New York City's most significant campaign season in modern history.

What is so significant about it?
For the first time in memory, most political offices in the city will be wide open to people who have neither money nor connections.

Why will the races be so open?
There are two reasons. This year, a new law goes into effect that limits the terms of New York City elected officials, forcing the mass retirement of most incumbents in the city - including the mayor, the comptroller, the public advocate, four of the five borough presidents, and 36 of the 51 members of the City Council. At the same time, a new campaign finance law kicks in, which allows any candidate who agrees to certain restrictions to collect four dollars of matching funds for every dollar they raise.

What does this have to do with this site?
As a public service, Searchlight on Campaign 2001 has a separate page for each race, including all the races for City Council, that not only sorts out the candidates -- many of them new and unfamiliar -- but also offers an opportunity to learn about the issues, and the districts themselves.

Who is behind Searchlight on Campaign 2001?
Searchlight on Campaign 2001 is a project of Gotham Gazette, a non-profit, non-partisan, non-ideological (but non-boring) web site about New York City news, policy and politics published by Citizens Union Foundation, part of the oldest and largest good-government group in the city (founded in 1897).

What's wrong with the way the regular press covers the races?
That is for you to decide. And one of our regular features, Campaign Trail, helps you to decide. Campaign Trail provides succinct summaries and links to campaign articles in the commercial press.

Who are we?



Remember the "borderline irresponsible" commercial that Mark Green did against Fernando Ferrer? That was modeled after an ad Walter Mondale used against Gary Hart in the presidential campaign of 1984, according to an adviser to the Mark Green campaign. Pollsters for Michael Bloomberg explained how they identified the "Middle Middle Democrats" who could be key to a Bloomberg victory. A consultant to Ferrer confessed his candidate's one big mistake. And an adviser to the Bloomberg campaign said that, in running the "Kill It" ad, the Green campaign "violated the norms of political discourse." Yes, apparently, there are norms.

On November 8, the political professionals who had been maneuvering against one another for months gathered under the auspices of New York University's political campaign management program to discuss and debate the strategies they used in this year's mayoral campaign. Excerpts from the discussion follow.


What were your goals in the primary campaign?

William Green (consultant to the Mark Green campaign): Given that there were four candidates, the focus of the primary was to get in the runoff.

Jeffrey Pollack (polling for the Fernando Ferrer campaign): Our strategy in the first round was absolutely to get 40 percent [to avoid the runoff]. Because there were three white candidates, we were the only candidate who could get the 40 percent. Based on the turnout information and other things I think it's possible that Freddy would have reached 40 percent on September 1'th [the day the primary was originally scheduled].

Joseph Mercurio (NYU faculty member; did the direct mail for the Herman Badillo campaign): The Ferrer campaign is the real story in the primary -- the ability of Ferrer to energize the Hispanic vote in a way that had not been done. New York is still a tribal politics city, and Freddy capitalized very heavily on the Hispanic vote and then managed ultimately to get the black leadership to come around and get the black vote solidified around his candidacy. They were on their way to picking up the white vote had there not been the attacks in the runoff.

Mark Mellman (did polling for the Mark Green campaign): Freddy was the only minority candidate in the race, and that was extraordinarily helpful to him. Freddy's candidacy became a cause for his voters, and I don't think the candidacies of any of the other Democrats were a cause for their voters.

We had radio commercials in the black community with Mayor Dinkins. We did work in the Hispanic community with Hispanic radio. But it's one thing to say, "I1m the white guy who's been a friend of this community." It's something else to say, "I am this community."

Doug Schoen (did polling for the Michael Bloomberg campaign): The Bloomberg campaign had the luxury of not having a very competitive primary. We used the primary for two things. One, to get Mike's name recognition up, to tell his story, but also to begin building our grassroots organization.


Moving to the runoff, what did you have to do there?

Mellman (Green): In one-on-one races with Ferrer we had started out with a significant lead. His victory in the primary, the attention that he got and the great advertising during the runoff made him not only a minority candidate but also an appealing candidate to significant numbers of white voters. When we did our first focus groups, the thing that we were most worried about was that Ferrer had tremendous potential appeal to white voters. They seem to have chosen the tactic of trying to solidify the minority base even at the expense of turning off white voters. Had he put together a black-Latino-white coalition he would have been really unstoppable. After the primary that appeal resurfaced to some extent. That was obviously of significant concern to us.

Pollack (Ferrer): Coming in first place [in the primary] was necessary to give us some kind of momentum and to have some people say that there was a juggernaut coming, although if you read the papers the day after the election you wouldn't know that Freddy Ferrer won the election. You would not know that he came in first, which I am confident would not have been the case had Mark Green done the exact same thing. So the momentum I thought we might get out of it actually was dampened.

A pattern then emerged. Mark Green had 30 percent of the vote two years ago; on primary day he had 30 percent of the vote. Mark got 30 percent of the vote because that is what he always got. He had 51 percent of the vote the day after the primary. Guess what? He got 51 percent of the vote on runoff election day. And in the final round, he had 47 percent of the vote after the runoff and got 47 percent of the vote on Election Day. He is not a candidate of growth.

Therefore what we needed to do was pull off votes. And we needed to get to these white voters. We tried in whatever way we could. It was very important to us to not get off the message entirely and look like we were shifting strategies and abandoning our "Two New Yorks" strategy.

Then the Green campaign did strategically a very, very smart thing: They put up a negative ad. That was helped by the one mistake our campaign did which was our World Trade Center speech. It allowed the press to pile on criticism of Freddy and gave the New York Times a chance to do what they wanted to do all along which was to talk about Freddy Ferrer as a creation of the Bronx party organization.

Mark's attack ad was meant to do one thing: motivate white Catholics to vote. If 15,000 white Catholics hadn't been motivated to vote [for Green] by an ad we would have won.

Mellman (Green): Our strategy with the attack was not aimed at motivating white Catholics to vote, It was to raise questions about Freddy Ferrer. Our sense was that he was getting a lot of positive reinforcement and he was not a well-known quantity, so we had to raise some doubts. The analogy was Gary Hart and Walter Mondale [in the campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1984]. Gary Hart had come out of New Hampshire with a big victory over Mondale. Mondale was the better known guy and ran the famous ad with the red telephone asking, "Is this guy really ready? Do you know who he is?" That was the model for what we did and was why we used the New York Times editorial to raise questions about whether Ferrer was really prepared.

Green (Green): Mark rightly called for rebuilding lower Manhattan as a priority when Freddy was still talking about dispersing it throughout the city. If nothing else it gave the New York Times, the Daily News and Crain's a reason to endorse Mark, and the Times endorsement of Mark really took Freddy apart. They eviscerated him as an organization hack.

Pollock (Ferrer): Our World Trade strategy, the speech that we made, was a mistake. But to be fair, Freddy said all these jobs are going to go to New Jersey so let's find a place for them for the next year and let's make sure that they1re in Brooklyn, the Bronx, in these four boroughs. He didn't say let's ship them out permanently. He then went back and did say that, which was a mistake.

Schoen (Bloomberg): We ran on a plan which, while certainly differently from Ferrer's, nonetheless animated the same themes. The fact he was a Hispanic borough president talking about dispersing jobs painted the perception that the plan was patronage and designed to try to take Wall Street jobs and move them to Central Harlem. Ferrer was not able to make the case that dispersal of jobs would benefit the entire populace.

Pollock (Ferrer): Freddy got hammered on it. And in some ways it was unfair, but it was still probably tactically a stupid mistake. On the other hand, I think Mark made a tactical mistake which was at the beginning he far overplayed his hand that it's all about lower Manhattan. He then tempered that.

Mellman (Green): There was some difference in the way minority voters and white voters responded to the World Trade Center. This was a horrific thing for New York, and I don't mean to create any separation here, but there was a difference in the way people reacted. The Ferrer campaign understood that and kept the focus very much on their previous agenda. For Freddy's constituency it was a secondary issue in some ways, while for our constituency it was more of a primary issue.

Mayor Giuliani asked the three remaining candidates to agree to let him remain in office for an additional three months. Green and Bloomberg agreed; Ferrer did not. How would you assess each campaign's handling of this issue?

Schoen (Bloomberg): Mark Green did exactly the right thing. He needed to get 80 odd percent of the white vote. The question that outer-borough Catholics had was, was he somebody who shared their view of the world. [By agreeing to the extension] he was able to mobilize that constituency. For the general election, had Mark come out against the Giuliani extension it would have created even more difficulties

Freddy made the right decision for him because [rejecting the mayor's plan] provided a constituency that could be mobilized, particularly in the black community. Both candidates did what they needed to.

Mellman (Green): The issue that was on the table was not the extension but the abolition of term limits. It was quite clear that if Rudy Giuliani was on the ballot, we were not going to win and neither was Mike Bloomberg, So what was important to us was to prevent Rudy Giuliani from being on the ballot.

You have a very much tighter transition here than you have for the president. You don't have the same resources available for the city transition as you do for the president, This obviously was a city in the midst of a very deep and shocking crisis. When Mark was thinking about [the extension], he was thinking about the transition itself. The politics were that if we got into a general election where we were against it, and Bloomberg was for it that's not something we could really survive.


Running as a Republican in an overwhelmingly Democratic city, what did Bloomberg have to do?

Schoen (Bloomberg): We knew from the start that we needed to create a broad based coalition. Second and probably more important we saw a need to create a broad-based message around economic change, economic development, economic growth and rebuilding that would be non partisan. Our whole goal was to say there isn't a Democratic or a Republican way for keeping jobs in the city or creating jobs or rebuilding New York.

The issue dynamic had changed. The downturn in the economy was more pronounced as an issue, the issue of rebuilding which obviously hadn't existed [before September 11] was preeminent in people's minds. An election that had been about education was now about a lot of very different things. So we saw ourselves able to build that cross-party, cross-ethnic cross-ideological coalition. The schism between Ferrer and Green in the runoff gave us the opportunity to build on the work we had done in the Hispanic community and to continue to try to get the quarter of the black vote we thought we needed to have a real chance to win.

Berland (Bloomberg): We approached the election very differently than politics as usual and targeting as usual. From the beginning, we had made the strategic decision to target voters on an attitudinal basis rather than along political lines.

There was a core group of voters who were going to make the difference in this election: middle middle Democrats. They were lower to middle income, they were both Hispanic and white, they were predominantly Catholic, they were in the outer boroughs. They respected that Mike was a self-made man, appreciated the fact that he would pay for the campaign himself and not use taxpayers' money, and they really were enjoying the quality of life that Rudy Giuliani had created in New York.

We went through four bases of a mail program with them. The first was to build our name awareness. In the second phase, we found out who would support us immediately, who would be undecided and who could never come into our camp. In the third phase, we got the issues and Mike's positions out. We started out with crime and education, and as the summer went on and the recession was looming, we moved to more of an economic message. In the fourth phase, we went straight to persuasion.

Our advertising, our mail and our phone program was all going through the lens of the middle middle Democrat. When we did our ad testing, we would test it with the middle middle Democrat. When we did our mail testing we tested it with the middle middle Democrats because our supporters were attitudinally aligned with the middle middle Democrats.

Schoen (Bloomberg): Mike Bloomberg did not want to run anything that appeared to be just an attack ad. Virtually all the ads we ran until the waning days of the campaign were comparative ads about our approach to city government versus Mark Green's approach. The only ad that I can think of that was a straight negative ad was the final ad of the election, the so-called Democrats on Mark Green ad, quotes of what Democrats said about Mark Green during the campaign. We felt putting Democrats talking about Mark Green on one hand and in the other instance Mark Green talking about Rudy Giuliani were perfectly fair and reasonable approaches.

Berland (Bloomberg): The groups that we were targeting didn't appreciate negatives. They were looking for a reason to support Mike. Our comparison ads were really trying to compare on the issues that were important in the election. Mike was very insistent that he wanted to keep it at that level

Schoen (Bloomberg): I think it would be useful for the Green campaign to speak to the very controversial decision to put the so-called "kill it" ad on. There is not much evidence that it helped and probably a lot of evidence that it hurt., Certainly, it. as I know them.

Mellman (Green): We decided in the runoff that we could and needed to run an attack ad that worked, and it did. In our tracking we were behind Freddy before we did that and after we were ahead so I think there's little question that it worked and it worked well

In the general election it was our hope to run a wholly positive campaign. The bottom line is we faced a situation where we were being overwhelmed, and so we had to go out and say something that raised questions about Mike Bloomberg. Our first attempt at a negative ad was on education. As the negative ads and the Giuliani ads and the mail and so on kept coming and things weren't working, our campaign became a little reluctant to stick with [it].

We were four points down on Sunday night. We could keep doing what we were doing and lose. Or we could try something else at the very last minute in hopes of pulling out a victory. We had tested a number of ads. The "kill it" ad was not our most effective ad. It was the most noticed ad. It generated the greatest degree of discussion. It broke through.

Did [the ad] help or did it hurt? We were down by four, We lost by three. That's really margin of error stuff.

There are three factors you have to look at in understanding the outcome of this election. The first is the spending and whether it's $60 million or $70 million, no one has ever been outspent by that amount of money and won an election. The direct mail budget for the Bloomberg campaign was larger than our entire campaign budget.

We thought we had enough money for two, maybe three television spots. We ended up doing slightly more than that which is more than we should have done. [The lack of money] forced upon us extraordinarily difficult choices. Not only was Mike Bloomberg spending a lot of money when our money was extremely restricted. but by buying the amount they bought they actually bid up the rate [charged for ad time].

My own belief is that without that money neither of the other factors I'm going to cite would have been decisive. The second was September 11, and I think September 11 did two things. First it turned Rudy Giuliani from a moderately popular mayor into a demigod, and that demigod status enables him to be effective in a wonderful endorsement commercial.

The second thing about September 11 is that it provided a rationale for the Bloomberg candidacy that otherwise might have been absent. The Bloomberg campaign in a series of very effective ads changed people's attitudes not just about Mike Bloomberg but about what was necessary for the job. Absent the devastation of September 11, it would have been a lot harder to tell people that what you really need is someone who had created jobs and done all the wonderful things in business that Mike Bloomberg had done.

The fracturing of the Democratic Party: There's no question that there was fracturing. What I think is abundantly clear though is that the black and Hispanic community at large did not initially have the same reaction to Mark Green and Mark Green's campaign as the leadership did. If you look at the polling right after we won the runoff, we were getting the kinds of margins among black and Hispanic voters that we needed to win. The [negative] reaction wasn't there in the community at large. It was there among certain elements of the leadership. Those people chose to vent their anger as publicly as possible, and the Bloomberg campaign brilliantly used that and used those comments to drive that wedge very effectively.,

Pollock (Ferrer): Mark [Mellman] brought up three points as to why Green campaign lost and not one of them was Mark Green, which I find remarkable. This is a man who needs to look in the mirror and ask himself why he lost and not just pass the blame to Freddy Ferrer and the Hispanics. I was there when Mark Green like a total idiot said to a group of elected officials "I can win without you. I can't govern without you." The arrogance of that man to say that was a mistake, a mistake by the way which he acknowledged one week later in another meeting

The Green candidate deserves a lot of responsibility for why he won or lost. Other Democratic candidates in the face of all this money etc., etc, I think would have won this race.

Mitchell Moss (NYU professor who advised the Bloomberg campaign): What I am concerned about is why Mark Green did not have an ad with any major Democrat. Mark Green had endorsements every day., Mrs. Clinton, the former president, Senator Schumer. Why did he never have a commercial with a Democratic elected official supporting him. You remember when he won the runoff. he was up there with him family. I said that's Mark Green's problem. He had nobody around him who was an elected official. The singularity of the campaign, the unwillingess to use other Democrats made him vulnerable.

Mellman (Green): There was an ad with Cuomo, which probably no one saw. It was a spending question. We were going to have a limited number of positive points Should we talk about Mark Green and his vision or should we use other people?

What are the long-term effects of this campaign on New York City politics?

Green (Green): The Democrats have to figure out how to make the party unified again and win election like they1re supposed to.

Mellman (Green): The thing that has been most disquieting to me is the way in which the racial politics has been handled. I1m speaking personally here. If the Amsterdam News [which endorsed Michael Bloomberg] talked about Freddy Ferrer and his gang of Latinos from the Bronx, could anyone have said, "I accept that endorsement but I would have used different words"? But when the Amsterdam News says "the gang of Jews from Brooklyn," [Bloomberg] can say, "I accept the endorsement but I would have used different words." At the same time, a New York Times editorial that attacks a Latino saying that his plan is borderline irresponsible is considered racist

There is something about this that is disquieting In this city, Al Sharpton is the person who gets to decide whether something is racist or not. I think that's dangerous. We1re veering into dangerous territory that has more profound implications than electoral implications.

Berland (Bloomberg): This campaign and Mike Bloomberg as a candidate is the first time in New York politics that we1ve seen a broad coalition of support. He won the white vote, he almost won the Hispanic vote and got sizable percentage of the black vote. His vision from the beginning was to try to transcend politics as usual, transcend party lines, transcend racial lines and really try to unify the city. What this election show is that it is possible.

Mercurio (Badillo): In recent years, the non-primary voting Democrats, are really mislabeled. They1re enrolled in the Democratic Party because most things happen in primaries, there's a lot of history here with the Democratic Party, there really isn't a Republican Party locally. That 30 percent of the Democratic Party has been up for grabs in recent years.

Pollock (Ferrer): In the end, Mark Green ends up being the Shimon Peres of New York politics: He loses the big ones but wins the little ones. It's very hard to beat $50 million or $70 million. The Latino vote does not come out of the civil rights movement as black voters do and therefore their ties to the Democratic Party are not nearly what the African American vote's tie to the Democratic Party is. It cannot be taken for granted, which is what they proved in this election. But more than anything, rumors of the Democratic Party's demise are grossly exaggerated. This was a campaign that was about an individual, and the two individuals who were on the ballot at the end of the day were Mark Green and Rudy Giuliani. That was what the election was about

Schoen (Bloomberg): What I think is probably most hopeful about this election from Bloomberg's perspective is that he did run a race as a unifier and had some considerable success at unifying the city. Whether that will continue or not is unclear. We don't know what's going to happen, we don't know what kind of success he's going to have But his ability to try to bring New York together at a time when we are facing incalculable social and economic ills is something that I think we should all earnestly applaud.

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Find what city council district you are in -- and learn more about what's going on there, and who's running.

What is this?
Gotham Gazette's Searchlight on Campaign 2001 offers a comprehensive look at what is being called New York City's most significant campaign season in modern history. (See the left-hand column for an explanation).

Districts of the Week

District 1 -- Lower Manhattan
Whoever wins the election in district 1 will represent immigrant Chinese garment workers, as well as Wall Street traders living in Battery Park City. There are several candidates hoping to be the council's firsts -- the first Asian-American man, the first Asian-American woman, the first gay Rhodes Scholar, the first dot-com guru -- running against some politically well connected opponents. Endorsements and fundraising will play a big role in this race. But voter turnout could be the main determinant of who will next represent district 1 on the council. The key question is how many voters from each community will come out on Election Day.

District 7 -- Washington Heights, Manhattan
The northern tip of Manhattan has become one of the most popular places for new immigrants to call home. The northern tip of Manhattan is a place that today's new immigrants call home. The majority have come from the Dominican Republic, but also from countries in South America, Eastern Europe, and Asia. But it is not just new immigrants that are moving in. Students, artists, and other Manhattanites looking for less expensive rents and larger apartments have also moved north. Ten Democratic candidates are competing for the 15,000 voters expected on primary day. The winner who emerges from a crowded field of candidates will have to balance the needs of the newcomers with those who have lived there for years.

District 16 -- Highbridge, Bronx
The neighborhoods of district 16 are the city's poorest, with the highest rate of unemployment and the lowest median household income. But those who live there also point out that much is positive and stable about the area, thanks in large part to local organizations, not-for-profit agencies, and houses of worship that help hold the neighborhoods together. Each candidate for City Council believes that through his or her connections to churches and local organizations, they can help empower the community toward a better life. Helen Foster, the current council member daughter, will face Michael Benjamin, who has worked as an aide to several government officials and Anthony Curry, a Bronx neighborhood activist.

District 20 -- Northeast Flushing, Queens
This year district 20 may elect the first Asian-American ever to the City Council to an area which now has the second highest number of immigrants from Korea and Taiwan in the city. There are three Asian candidates in the Democratic race who have each drawn big endorsements. Council Speaker Peter Vallone endorsed Terence Park, City Comptroller Alan Hevesi endorsed John Liu, and the New York Times recently endorsed Ethel Chen The campaign has also drawn national and international press coverage

District 25 -- Jackson Heights, Queens
Thirty-seventh Avenue in Jackson Heights, Queens is one of the most diverse streets in the world. Little India quickly blends into Little Colombia, with vendors selling Latin American food to Colombians, Peruvians, Ecuadorians, Mexicans, and Uruguayans. And each summer, the Queens Pride Parade fills the same street with rainbow banners. So it is no surprise that this election year the district produced a diverse field of candidates. A number of them, however, found out that getting on the ballot is not an easy task, especially when the Queens Democratic organization sends teams of lawyers to challenge petitions. But five Democratic candidates survived and will face off on September 11.

District 31 -- South East Queens
When a heavy rain hits southeast Queens, many residents in neighborhoods like Springfield Gardens, Laurelton and Rosedale head to the basement with a bucket in hand. And it has been that way for the last 50 years. In the rush to build housing in the area after World War II, developers overlooked the need for storm drains in hopes that the city would eventually build a city-wide sewer system. The plan never materialized and the area has experienced "100-year rains" three times in the last decade. The eight Democrats -- all with little experience overseeing massive infrastructure projects--will try to convince voters that they can finally solve the flooding problems.

District 35 -- Central Brooklyn
The residents in council district 35 have some of the highest incomes in Brooklyn and some of the lowest. They can play in a famous park and a beautiful botanical garden, and live in the city's most crumbling public housing. They can attend one of the four institutions of higher learning in the district, and the worst-scoring high schools in the city. Such juxtapositions are a way of life for a district that includes the Brooklyn Academy of Music, the Brooklyn Museum, and the Brooklyn Botanical Gardens; mid dle-class African-American communities near Prospect Park; immigrant communities from Haiti, Sierra Leon, Nigeria, and Trinidad, and in Crown Heights, a mix of Hasidic Jews and African-Americans. Seven Democratic candidates are campaigning in hopes that they can bring some kind of unity, and attention, to the area. Their backgrounds are as diverse as the neighborhoods themselves.

District 39 -- Park Slope/Carroll Gardens, Brooklyn
The candidates in district 39 include a chief of staff for an Assemblywoman, the husband of a member of U.S. Congress, a lawyer for the Legal Aid Society, an attorney and president of the Central Brooklyn Independent Democrats, Senator Hillary Clinton's campaign manager, the district manager of Community Board 6, and a labor organizer. This is the race to watch this year. The group of high-profile Democrats have raised a lot of money, almost $1.4 million combined.

District 45 -- East Flatbush
In no place in the city are the effects of campaign finance reform and term limits being felt more than in East Flatbush. The seven Democratic candidates seeking to represent this largely West Indian district come from a number of Caribbean nations. Many have been working on politicians' staffs and serving with community groups, clearly hoping someday to win their own elected office. Term limits has presented them with that opportunity, and they want to make the most of it. But this race that usually draws only about 8,000 voters could be decided by just a few votes. The candidates are attempting to come up with anything that will separate them from the pack.

District 49 -- North Shore, Staten Island
Staten Island has always been somewhat of a suburban stepchild to New York City. When a 1998 survey asked New Yorkers why they go to Staten Island, the top two responses were ''visiting friends and relatives" and ''passing through.'' But in many ways, the north shore has more in common with areas of Manhattan and Brooklyn than with the rest of the Staten Island. The top priority for all the candidates -- Jon Del Giorno, an administrative manager for the Board of Elections, Mike McMahon, an attorney and counsel to current Councilmember Jerome O'Donovan, and Debi Rose, an administrator at the College of Staten Island and the first African-American candidate in Staten Island politics -- is to make sure that the island becomes more than just a turn-around-point for the over one million tourists who ride the free ferry from Manhattan each year.

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Board of Elections
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Links You Can Use

Government sites
NYC Campaign Finance Bd.
NYC Board of Elections
NYC Voter Assistance Comm.
NY City Council
Federal Election Comm.

Local non-partisan sites
NY League of Women Voters
Common Cause New York

National non-partisan sites
Ctr. for Responsive Politics
Common Cause
League of Women Voters

NAACP Voter Empowerment
Vote Smart


Political consultants
Amer. Assc. of Pol. Consultants

Prime New York

Gotham Gazette
The Empire Page
Campaigns and Elections
Legislative Gazette

Political columnists
Andrea Bernstein
Joe Conason
Mario Cuomo (radio)
Rudy Giuliani (radio)
Clyde Haberman
Nat Hentoff

Joseph Mercurio
Joyce Purnick
John Tierney
Michael Tomasky

Political parties
Right to Life
Working Families
Marijuana Reform
Natural Law Party
Taxpayers Party

Political clubs and groups
Blueprint Camp. Finance Reform
Central Queens Greens
The Jefferson Democratic Club of Flushing
NY Young Republican Club
Stonewall Democratic Club
Village Independent Dems.

Abbreviations for Party Affiliation

American Dream Party (AMD)
Better Schools Party (BES)
Communist (Com)
Conservative (Con)
Constitution (CST)
Democratic (Dem)
Friends United Party (FUN)
Fusion Party (FUS)
Green (Gre)
Harmony Party (HAR)
Independence (Ind)
Liberal (Lib)
Libertarian (LBT)
Marijuana Reform Party (POT)
Natural Law Party (NLP)
Party of Ethics and Traditions (PET)
Reform Party (Ref)
Republican (Rep)
Right to Life (RTL)
School Choice Party (Sch)
Socialist Workers Party (SWP)
Working Families (Wor)

2001 Election Calendar

June 1 -- Deadline for candidates to join the Campaign Finance program, qualifying for the four-to-one match of contributions.
June 5 - First day for candidates from the eight major parties (Democratic, Republican, Indpendence, Conservative, Liberal, Green, Working Families, and Right to Life) to circulate petitions. Candidates running for City Council must collect the signatures of at least 900 people living in the district for which they are running in order to appear on the Primary ballot. Candidates not running under these eight major parties do not appear on the Primary ballot and have a separate set of deadlines.
July 12 - Deadline for major party candidates to file petitions.
July 10 - First day for unaffiliated candidates to circulate petitions, in order to appear on the ballot in the General Election. They must collect the number of signatures equal to five percent of the total enrolled in that party.
August 7 - Board of Elections announces candidates appearing on the Primary ballot.
August 17 - Last day for non-absentee voters to register to vote in the Primary Election.
August 21 - Deadline for non-major party candidates to file petitions to be included on the General Election ballot.
September 4 - Last day to postmark application for absentee voting in the Primary
September 10 - Last day to personally deliver application for absentee voting in the Primary Last day to postmark absentee ballot for Primary
September 11 - Primary election; Polls open at 6:00a.m. and close at 9:00p.m.; Absentee ballots must be hand-delivered by 9:00 p.m.
September 25 - Runoff Primary election for Mayor, Comptroller and Public Advocate, if needed
October 12 - Last day to for non-absentee voters to register to vote in the General Election
October 30 - Last day to postmark application for absentee voting in the General Election
November 5 - Last day to hand-deliver an application for absentee voting, or to postmark an absentee ballot for the General Election.
November 6 - General Election; polls open at 6:00a.m. and close at 9:00p.m. in NYC; Absentee ballots must be hand-delivered by 9:00 p.m.

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