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Staten Island Ferry Crash Remains A Puzzle


One very simple question lies at the heart of the investigations into the October 15 crash of the Andrew J. Barberi ferry into a Staten Island pier, which killed 10 people and injured dozens of others: Why didn’t the vessel slow down as it approached the pier? National Transportation Safety Board investigators have found that the ferry was moving at nearly its top speed when it hit the pier. Investigators have also concluded that the ferry had no mechanical problems and have found no illegal drugs, no alcohol and no prescription drugs in the pilot’s blood.

The ferry’s pilot, Richard J. Smith, suggested in a brief statement immediately after the crash that he had lost consciousness. The captain, Michael J. Gansas said on the same day that he was in the pilothouse of the ferry and tried to stop the ferry from slamming into the pier. This initial story quickly fell apart, thanks to eye witnesses, but thus far, neither Smith or Gansas have been talking.

The second puzzle about the accident involves where Gansas should have been during docking. City officials say that standard operating procedures require the captain to be in the pilothouse. Yet the New York Post reports that 10 former or current ferry workers said that the city notified them of this requirement for the first time on November 3, two weeks after the crash. The Post reports that city officials were unable to prove that employees had been notified of the rule prior to October 15. Ferry workers said that it was standard practice for the pilot and captain to be at opposite ends of the boat, with one handling dockings on the Staten Island side and the other handling Manhattan dockings. According to the workers, “ferry bosses” were well aware of that practice. Gansas’ lawyers are now hinting that their defense will claim that captains were never required to be in the pilot house during docking.

A third puzzle about the crash is why city officials are acting so surprised about the accident. City transportation officials point out that the Staten Island ferry has experienced “no major accidents” in its 98-year history. Yet the ferry’s history of minor accidents and near misses suggest that it was only a matter of time. Two hundred passengers were injured in 1978 when the ferry crashed into a seawall, and a December 1992 accident injured no one but caused $120,000 in damage to the vessel. More importantly, the New York Times reports that Coast Guard investigations concluded that mistakes or acts of negligence contributed to these and other accidents. Coast Guard recommendations were never implemented, however, a fact noted by subsequent Coast Guard investigations. In fact, after a September 1998 accident that injured two passengers, the Coast Guard recommended that two crew members be present in the pilot house to watch for potential problems as the ferry approached the terminal. Had that recommendation been put in effect, the October 15 accident might never have occurred.

A fourth puzzle thus is why the Coast Guard safety recommendations were not implemented. The Times reports that ferry operations vary widely from one captain to another. Each ferry is run as a virtual fiefdom of the captain. The Times concluded that “tradition and habit often trump formal procedure” on the ferries. The New York Observer adds another factor – patronage. The Observer reports that ferry workers were protected so long by politicians that workers did not even bother to hide the fact that many do not live in the city, as required by city policy. This context may help explain the lack of follow-through on the Coast Guard’s simple recommendations for corrective action.

A fifth and perhaps the most important question is whether the city will now fix the ferry. One would like to see the city identify the systematic problems with ferry procedures, training and supervision that contributed to this and previous accidents. Indeed, city transportation officials say they are exploring whether new safety procedures need to be developed.

But the city’s initial actions give the appearance that the city is focused on assigning blame to individual workers. Questioned about whether workers had received the standard operating procedures, a spokesman for the City Transportation Department said simply, “The captain is ultimately in charge of the ship.” As to the rest of the crew, the city required all ferry workers to sign an acknowledgement that they recently received the standard operating procedures. The city is also taking steps to ensure that ferry workers live in the city after press reports that Gansas actually lived in Haslet, New Jersey. These steps rather beg the issue of whether the crew is properly trained and supervised.

Ferry safety will apparently require not only clearer procedures, better training and more vigilant supervision, but given comments by a former senior ferry worker quoted in the Times, also a better understanding of what safety requires. This former official said he would put Staten Island ferry officers “up against anyone at Cunard or anywhere else. They’re stone-cold professionals.” But this same former official said that having a second officer assist in docking “would be redundant and necessary only if someone is gong to have a heart attack or some type of episode.”

Yes, well, exactly. Even on the cute little Staten Island ferry, redundancy could be a very important part of safe operations.

Bruce Schaller is Principal of Schaller Consulting, which provides research and analysis to government, business and non-profit groups seeking to identify and meet customer needs in the transportation sector. He is also a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Transportation Policy and Management at New York University.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

East River Bridge Tolls


The mayor's shifting positions on East River bridge tolls illustrates the tension between the conclusions of Mayor Michael Bloomberg's analytical mind and the consequences of his political education.

Two years ago, Bloomberg's mayoral platform was sympathetic to bridge tolls. Once inaugurated as mayor, Bloomberg included East River bridge tolls in budget plans which assumed that "congestion pricing" would generate $100 million to $800 million annually.

That was the high-water mark of the mayor's support for this controversial concept. After Bloomberg closed the budget gap this spring with a heavy reliance on tax increases, his public opinion poll ratings dropped sharply. Facing growing unpopularity both citywide and particularly among Brooklyn and Queens residents who would pay the bulk of any East River bridge tolls, Bloomberg backed away from his toll plans. He dropped tolls from City Hall's budget plans and his spokesman said on July 9 that "the plan to toll the East River bridges is off the table."

The political realities and their consequences were clear. But as Bloomberg continues to think about the logic behind tolls, he does not completely shun the idea of at least someday tolling the bridges. The day after his spokesman said they were "off the table," Bloomberg clarified that "there is no current plan" to toll the bridges while also declaring that "we should consider all options down the road." In explaining his reasoning, Bloomberg focused on the practical problem that tolls could not be implemented in time to help the fiscal year 2004 or 2005 budgets.

The issue has not gone away. Two new reports on bridge tolls were released in late September and early October. The NYPIRG Straphangers Campaign and Transportation Alternatives, transportation advocacy groups, released a 58-page study (that I prepared) laying out the advantages of East River bridge tolls and issues that need further study. The Independent Budget Office released a report that assesses the potential revenues from both East River and Harlem River tolls, who would pay the tolls (mostly city residents) and the impact of possible exemptions.

Bridge toll advocates point out that "there is no such thing as a free bridge." The East River bridges cost taxpayers several hundred million dollars a year to maintain and operate, and $1.62 billion over the past 10 years to rebuild. These costs are paid by all city taxpayers whether or not they use the bridges. By contrast, motorists who use the Metropolitan Transportation Authority's tunnels and bridges to enter Manhattan pay a $3.50 toll. Likewise, subway and bus riders who use transit to cross the East River - which accounts for most of the trips crossing that body of water - pay the $2 transit fare. Only motorists on the city's four East River spans can cross for free.

Fairness would thus argue in favor of bridge users as well as others paying a toll or fare. East River tolls would raise somewhat over $500 million a year for city coffers and $100 million for the MTA, as some drivers switch to MTA crossings once the city bridges are also tolled. Harlem River tolls would generate $190 million a year in revenues. Toll revenues would cover the cost of maintaining, repairing and rebuilding the bridges, thus providing relief to the city budget. Some of the revenue could be used for other transportation improvements, including improved express bus or other transit services for Brooklyn and Queens residents who currently face lengthy transit rides into Manhattan.

Another argument for tolls involves traffic congestion. The free city-owned bridges have attracted a growing number of motorists who want to avoid paying the MTA tolls. The Brooklyn Bridge is the most affected. Traffic studies have shown that one-third of motorists entering Manhattan via the Brooklyn Bridge literally drive past the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel to avoid the tunnel toll. Overall, tolls would reduce traffic on the bridges by about 25 percent, and reduce traffic in Downtown Brooklyn and Long Island City by up to 14 percent.

Opponents of bridge tolls believe that they would divide the city, be bad for business and be unfair to Queens and Brooklyn residents. Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz, quoted in the Daily News, said that tolls would be a "tremendous economic burden on the businesses and residents of Brooklyn, many of whom are forced to drive because they have no other public transportation options." The head of the Brooklyn Academy of Music also opposes tolls, which she believes would discourage Manhattan residents from coming to BAM.

Councilmember John Lui, who represents Flushing, Queens and is chairman of the City Council Transportation Committee, wants to see improvements in subway and ferry services before tolls are considered. Quoted in the Queens Chronicle, Liu said, "you would be inhibiting people from Queens and Brooklyn from transportation into Manhattan, which is just not acceptable."

How the public feels about tolls depends on how they are asked. A Quinnipiac University poll in February 2003 found that 63 percent of New Yorkers thought tolls were a "bad idea." Yet asked in a July 2002 poll to choose among various ways to balance the city budget, 40 percent choose tolls over options of increasing taxes or increasing subway and bus fares.

Given the opposition, bridge tolls are unlikely to advance before the mayoral election in 2005. In the mayor's latest comment, he said, "Nothing should ever be totally taken off the table, but to do tolling on the bridges would require a lengthy environmental impact statement, it would require state legislation, it would be a long time before that could be implemented. Some of the effect of reducing traffic and that sort of thing would be ... a good idea, but I think, if you really look at it, it's not a short-term solution to our problems."

Thus, although still not entirely closing the door to tolls, Bloomberg's short-term focus on re-election means that he would rather talk about reducing taxes than talk any more about bridge tolls.

Bruce Schaller is Principal of Schaller Consulting, which provides research and analysis to government, business and non-profit groups seeking to identify and meet customer needs in the transportation sector. He is also a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Transportation Policy and Management at New York University.

Ranking The Subway Lines


Former Mayor Edward I. Koch was famous for asking, "How'm I doing?" He usually received an earful.

In the last two decades, governmental agencies in New York have gotten an earful too. Often, this is the result of reports generated internally, but, in the case of the subways, it is helped along by report of the New York Public Interest Research Group Straphangers Campaign on the State of the Subways. Straphangers' annual subway service report culls data from New York City Transit to evaluate and rank each of the subway system's lines. Scores are based on the frequency and regularity of service, rate of breakdowns, chance of getting a seat, cleanliness inside the cars and in-car announcements.

This year, the L train gained the #1 ranking, based in part on the arrival of new subway cars that reduced the frequency of breakdowns. Other high-ranked lines were the #3, D, E, #6 and #1/9. Ranked last was the #5 line, bedeviled by a high breakdown rate, irregular train arrivals and severe crowding. Other low scorers were the N, C, M and R.

The report also highlighted how service has improved in some respects and worsened in others since release of the 2000 report. (No report was done in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks.) The good news is that subway cars are breaking down far less often than they did in 2000. In the second half of 2002, subway cars traveled an average of 151,300 miles without a mechanical problem causing a delay, compared with 110,600 in the second half of 2000. This improvement largely reflects the arrival of new high-tech subway cars.

The bad news is that subway cars were less clean in 2002 than 2000. Over this time period, the proportion of subway cars with clean seats and floors declined from 85 percent to 78 percent.

One of the strengths of the Straphangers report is the detail by subway line. The line-specific data show how varied service is across the system. Take subway car breakdowns, for example. While breakdowns lessened on 10 lines, the situation worsened on five lines (1/9, 4, 7, A and N). Conversely, while cleanliness worsened on 12 lines, it improved on three lines (2, 3 and A).

Looking across subway lines, breakdowns occur twice as often on the #5, #7, A, R and V as compared with the #3, D, L and Q.

Straphangers is not the only organization to make performance indicators readily available for public viewing. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority recently began to put system-wide performance statistics on its website. Currently showing data through May 2003, the MTA data are more up-to-date compared with the Straphangers report for the latter part of 2002. But the MTA does not break out subway lines or other geographic detail.

City agencies also make performance indicators available on the Internet. The Transportation Department, however, focuses on work measures such as traffic lights installed and permits issued, rather than performance measures. One performance measure concerning Staten Island ferry on-time performance is included.

What comes of the considerable effort put forth to measure agency performance? In some cases, such as the Department of Transportation, what is actually measured is not actually service performance and thus does not fulfill the basic objectives of these efforts.

In other cases, performance is measured but little heed is paid, or action taken, based on the results.

But when agency officials and the public pay attention and take these measures seriously, real improvements felt by everyday citizens can occur. Straphangers has found that complaints and advocacy based on their past reports improved service on certain subway lines. Within government agencies, managers' feet can be held to the fire to produce better results.

More broadly, these reports have two very positive effects. First, they focus attention on the right set of issues. The old saw at the Transit Authority went that the trains would run just fine if there were no passengers. On-time performance was once measured solely by when trains arrived at the end of the line, and dispatchers have been caught faking the numbers. New indicators such as the regularity of train arrivals reflect how passengers actually experience subway service. In government, what isn't measured generally didn't happen, at least officially, so having official and systematic statistics that reflect riders' experiences is very valuable.

Second, these reports underscore that budgetary decisions and choices about priorities have real consequences. The subway car breakdown rate on the L line improved because of millions of dollars spent to purchase them. As the city undergoes one round of budget cutting after another, it's worth watching how services are affected.

Like any good thing, however, performance measurement can have unintended consequences. High-stakes testing in schools has resulted in recently publicized scandals over underreported dropout rates and serious doubt about the appropriateness of Regents exams. Let's hope that performance measures in transit and transportation get the attention they deserve, but without these types of abuses.

Bruce Schaller is Principal of Schaller Consulting, which provides research and analysis to government, business and non-profit groups seeking to identify and meet customer needs in the transportation sector. He is also a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Transportation Policy and Management at New York University.



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